The 1905 bloody Sunday massacre: American reactions by Westrate, Judy M
University of Nebraska at Omaha
DigitalCommons@UNO
Student Work
6-6-1973
The 1905 bloody Sunday massacre: American
reactions
Judy M. Westrate
University of Nebraska at Omaha
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by
DigitalCommons@UNO. It has been accepted for inclusion in Student
Work by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UNO. For
more information, please contact unodigitalcommons@unomaha.edu.
Recommended Citation
Westrate, Judy M., "The 1905 bloody Sunday massacre: American reactions" (1973). Student Work. 361.
https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork/361
THE 1905 BLOODY SUNDAY MASSACRE: 
AMERICAN REACTIONS
A Paper 
Presented to the 
Department of History 
University of Nebraska at Omaha
In Partial Fulfillment for a 
Masters of Arts Degree in History
by
Judy M. Westrate 
June 6 , 1973
UMI Number: EP72999
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Published by ProQuest LLC (2015). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI EP72999
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
THESIS ACCEPTANCE
Accepted for the faculty of the Graduate College of the University 
of Nebraska at Omaha, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the 
degree Master of Arts.
Graduate Committee
Name Departitten
Date,
TABLE OP CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION..........    ill
CHAPTER I. CLIMATE OF THE STRIKE....................   1
CHAPTER II. BLOODY SUNDAY. . . . ...............   6
CHAPTER III. FATHER GAPON.  ..............    16
CHAPTER IV. AMERICAN REACTION. . .  ...............   3^
CONCLUSION . . .  ..........................................  55
APPENDIX.........................       59
BIBLIOGRAPHY  ..............................   67
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Perhaps the most influential person who affected the 
completion of this paper is my husband David. To him, I give 
grateful thanks for the encouragement and persistence he gave 
me the entire time I was working on the topic. I also offer 
my thanks to Dr. Paul Beck for giving me the patience required 
for a long-distance student. Finally I make special thanks 
to the librarians at the Downers Grove Public Library who 
ordered books for me from long distances.
ii
INTRODUCTION
On January 22, 1905 in St. Petersburg, Russia a crowd of 
workingmen gathered at the Nevsky Prospect, in the Palace Square, 
and on the other avenues of St. Petersburg. This crowd, led by 
Father George Gapon, was on a mission to talk to the Czar —  their 
"Little Father” —  because their factory employers had refused to 
take any action respecting their grievances. They were greatly 
agitated because four workmen had been dismissed at the great 
Putiloff factory and because their requests for an eight hour day, 
higher pay, better sanitary conditions, and the right to elect 
arbitration committees, had been refused. They had struck; but 
their employers did not take action. Father Gapon, the founder of 
the Assembly of Russian Factory Workers of St. Petersburg, had 
convinced them that they might plead their case before the All- 
Highest, the Czar. They had a petition addressed to their 
sovereign; they were asking for protection from being treated like 
slaves. They had reached a point where "death'was to be preferred 
to a continuation of (theirj intolerable sufferings." These work­
men, their wives and children bore no arms —  only this plea to 
their ruler. What did they receive in return? Bullets, swords, 
and death. Ironically, the Czar was not even in the Winter Palace. 
A shot fired accidentally from one of the saluting guns near him 
while he was blessing the waters of the Neva on January 19th, was 
interpreted by the Czar as an attempt on his life. Consequently,
iii
he had fled St. Petersburg. In the Czar's absence, Grand Duke 
Vlaaimer took it upon himself to order the strikers shot down. 
Hundreds or thousands of persons were reportedly killed.
Why did this riot take place? There were complicated rea­
sons. How did the United States and Americans react to this 
massacre? They reacted in different ways. The purpose of this 
paper is to give a brief account of what stimulated the demonstra­
tion, explain the role of Father Gapon, discuss the lack of official 
reaction on the part of the United States government, and finally, 
analyze the reaction of the American public to this "Bloody Sunday"
j
as speni through selected newspaper and periodical accounts of the
iv
CHAPTER I
CLIMATE OP THE STRIKE
When discussing the “Bloody Sunday" of 1905 in
St. Petersburg, Russia, it is necessary to look into the factors
!
which helped to create a climate in which such an outrage could 
occur•
At the beginning of the twentieth century, more legal power
was concentrated in the hands of the ruler of Russia than in
' !
thosjs 6f any other person on earth. The ruling Czar was
i !
Nicholas II? coming to power in 189^5 he had unlimited sovereign­
ty over some 135 million subjects living in an area that included 
over a seventh of the earth's surface.* Historians consider 
Nicholas II to be one of Russia's worst rulers. Though staunchly 
autocratic, he had little ability or inclination to rule. His 
reign saw great expansion of industry which led to growth of 
organized opposition to the government, both among moderate 
liberals and radical revolutionaries. During his reign, there 
was also a great increase in peasant and worker unrest.
I ■
! Liberal opposition groups began to develop in the late
i
nineteenth century. Heading this movement were the zemstov 
organizations which consisted mainly of professional men such as
’ 11 Sidney Harcave, First Blood a The Russian Revolution of 190 5 
(New York1 The Macmillan Company, 196k ) , p. 69I (Hereinafter 
referred to as First Blood.)
2doctors and teachers. ' The revolutionary movement, held in check 
by Alexander III, began to grow in the 1890*s. The workers* 
unrest and dissatisfaction began to increase under the harsh 
conditions of an intensified industrial program of the late l890*s 
and early 1900*s. Peasant unrest also continued to grow during 
this time.
The appeal of Marxism began to make headway in Russia in 
the I890*s, especially among university students, as Russia 
became more industrialized. Various kinds of Marxism arose during 
this period. The Legal Marxism group followed the lead of the 
German Marxist-Revisionist, Bernstein. He asserted that the 
violent revolutionary upheaval forecast by Marx would not occur, 
and that Marxists should concentrate their efforts on encouraging 
reforms rather than revolution. The Economism group was s im i lar 
to the Legal Marxists but was more practically oriented. They 
advocated working in terms of better work conditions, higher wages 
and worker benefits.
The theories of the Legal Marxists and the program of the 
Economists were denounced by the politically-minded Marxists led 
by the founder of the Russian Marxism, Plekhanov, and by Lenin, the 
future Bolshevik leader. These political Marxists believed their 
task was to work for revolution, and scorned reform as helpful to 
the government. A Congress was held at Minsk in 1898 but the 
participants were arrested. A second Congress was held in 1903*
At this Congress the Marxists established the Russian Social 
Democratic Labor Party. During the second Congress in 1903 the
3Social Democrats split into two factions— the Bolsheviks (the 
majority) and the Mensheviks (the minority)• These factions came 
to be created by the split in the vote on the issue of Party 
organization. Lenin’s group outnumbered the group led by 
Martov and thus Lenin named his group the Bolsheviks. At times, 
the Mensheviks outnumbered the Bolsheviks— despite the names.
The Mensheviks differed from the Bolsheviks in a number of 
ways. They felt all sympathizers should be admitted to their 
party whereas the Bolsheviks said that only a tightly-knit group 
of professional revolutionaries could belong. In contrast to a 
Menshevik view that discussion and leadership of the party should 
be shared, the Bolsheviks believed that party leadership must be 
by the elite few whose authority must be absolute and unquestion­
ed. On the one hand Mensheviks envisioned a bourgeois revolution 
followed by a long bourgeois democracy and then a socialist 
revolution. On the other hand, the Bolsheviks saw a bourgeois 
revolution followed by a dictatorship of the peasants and 
proletariat. Finally, the Mensheviks shunned the peasantry and 
allied with the middle classes and liberal bourgeosie to over­
throw the autocracy. But the Bolsheviks scorned the liberal and 
middle^class groups to ally itself solely with the peasantry.
The Socialist Revolutionaries also formed a party in the 
1900*s. Like the Bolsheviks, they believed the key to revolution 
lay in the peasantry. They renewed political terror and carried 
out a number of assassinations of public officials in the early 
1900*s.
In addition to the rise of political awareness, the 1890’s
4and 1900's saw serious strikes in the cities which arose out of
the total lack of personal freedom in Russia. Sidney Harcave
r
discusses this lack of freedom in his book First Blood:
Extensive authority was delegated to the governors- 
.general, governors, and prefects, each of whom was 
appointed by the tsar and required to report to the 
minister of interior. . . . These officials exercised 
arbitrary power when the tsar, using the authority 
decreed by the Law on Exceptional Measures, of 1881, 
placed a city, province, or district under "reinforced 
protection," which gave its administrator limited emergency 
power to deal with any condition or situation that he 
considered a threat to law and order; or under "extra­
ordinary protedtion," which extended the administrator's 
emergency power to include the right on his own authority to 
banish persons from the area, to close newspapers and fac­
tories, to arrest and fine individuals, and prohibit any 
kind of"private gathering. By the beginning of 1904, more 
than half of Russia, including most of her major cities, 
was under some form of "protection". . . .
Nowhere in Europe were the police as numerous, as 
venal, or as powerful as those of Russia. Most un­
restricted in., their authority were the political 
police. . . . V
In addition to dissatisfaction over the total absence of 
political or personal freedom, and growing concern over poor 
working conditions, the embarrassment over the war with Japan in 
the 1900's added to the turmoil of unrest growing in Russia.
The initial reverses in the Japanese War produced deep mortifica­
tion in Russia. The Russian conduct of the war was more 
humiliating than the Japanese victories. The systematic mis- 
representations of the officialrtelegrams only exaggerated the
i
effect of the private news; the Viceroy Alexeyeff was deeply 
mistrusted. The few good officers showed by comparison the
^Harcave, First Blood, p. 15.
5incompetence of the other officers of all ranks. Embezzlement 
was common, even goods sent to the Red Cross were sold in Moscow. 
The Petropovlovsk was sunk outside Port Arthur and the disastrous 
battle of Liaoyang followed .close upon it. Plehve, the Minister 
of the Interior, was hated and was assassinated on July 28, 190^.
\ After Plehve*s death came the appointment of Svyatopolk- 
Mirsky. At first he was well-received, and a time of relief 
resulted. ^Liberators and Zemstov organizations were busy. Too 
busy, evidently, for a crack-down ensued and repression reigned 
once again. Meanwhile the reverses in the war continued.
Raising recruits and sending off reservists sometimes led to 
serious disorders. To combat such disorders, meetings were for­
bidden and officials who took part in them were subjected to 
special punishment. The Zemstva were not to discuss questions 
outside their competence; the Press was ordered to write articles 
intended to calm the populace. Other newspapers suffered from 
censorship. On January 19» at a religious ceremony in 
St. Petersburg, an accidental shot from a saluting battery 
threatened danger to the life of the Emperor, who fled the 
capital, not to return for more than a year.1 It was at this 
point that the workmen actively entered into the protest movement.
Michael T. Florinsky, Encyclopedia of Russia and the 
Soviet Union. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc.', 1961),
pp. 3^6-350. Most of the information in this chapter was gained 
from this source.
CHAPTER II
BLOODY SUNDAY
The revolutionary movement in Russia, held In check during 
the reign of Alexander III, revived and grew In the 1890's. 
Liberal Opposition grew until serious strikes occurred in the 
early 1900's. The Russo-Japanese war aroused general hostility 
toward the regime of Nicholas II and the workingmen of Russia 
were restless and discontented; the industrial expansion of 
Russia had created harsh conditions for the working population. 
Into this atmosphere of unrest and discontent in St. Petersburg 
walked Father Gapon--a handsome, bearded man, with a rich voice 
that spell-bound the people. He appealed to the workingman be­
cause he stood close to them; he was born a peasant in 1870 and 
was deeply interested in the conditions of labor, sympathetically 
affected by the injustices he saw, and sincerely dedicated to 
their correction, As such he was accepted by the St. Petersburg 
workers. Because he seemed interested in the people and not 
revolutionary, Gapon was encouraged by the government to form the 
Assembly of Russian Factory Workers of St. Petersburg. He opened
1
the union In April of 190^.
Its aims, inter alia, were to affirm 'national conscious­
ness* amongst the workers, develop 'sensible views' 
regarding their rights and foster amongst the members of 
the Assembly 'activity facilitating the legal improvements
6
of the workers' conditions of work and living.'"!
The groups of the society could set up their own tea rooms and 
stores; they could set up mutual-aid funds, go to concerts and 
lectures; and even have legally approved chances for discussing 
their needs and legitimate grievances. These sanctioned 
assemblages gave the workers opportunity to communicate with 
different labor groups and the spirit to cry out against injustices 
Thus, the growth of the union backfired on the officials as the 
union ". . . developed into a 'cross between a trade union, a 
mutual aid society and even an underground revolutionary organi- 
zation;'. . . . "  By the end of 190^ the Assembly had a mem­
bership divided into eleven sections with cells in most of the 
larger factories, including a particularly strong contingent at 
the Putilov works:
. . . the strength of the Assembly and of its sympa­
thizers exceeded by far that of the political parties.
In St. Petersburg at this time, for example, the local 
Menshevik and Bolshevik committees could muster no more 
than three hundred members each. This disparity accounts 
. no doubt for the interest that Liberals, Social-Democrats 
and Socialist-Revolutionaries all took in Gapon's 
Assembly.3
The growth of the society was relatively slow initially, 
but as the workers became more and more disenchanted and dis-
^■Lionel Kochan, Russia in Revolution 1890-1918 (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicholson. 1966), pp. 7^-75. (Hereafter 
referred to as Kochan, Russia in Rev.)
2Ibld.
3Ibid.
8gruntled they increasingly joined the Assembly to have the 
opportunity to air their concerns and complaints. They began to 
feel that those who ruled Russia were inefficient and corruptj 
consequently, there were many strikes and mass demonstrations 
from 1900-1905 and after. Their main objectives were economic; 
but local Social-Democratic committees were very active in put-'
• j
ting forth political demands.
The workers were not only disgusted and dissatisfied with
their employers and their working conditions, they were also
disenchanted with the Russo-Japanese war. The news from the
front seemed to reinforce the antigovernment propaganda published
by the socialists. "The shock of Russia's ignominious defeat in
the Japanese war accelerated the pace of the reform and the
revolutionary movements which had been gathering strength for a
decade, culminating in the violent outbreak known as the
1
revolution of 1905•*
This climate of discontent was destined to worsen and 
eventually build into an outburst. Gapon foresaw that Russian 
society was undergoing many stresses. He predicted that a crisis 
would occur if the bureaucracy did not begin to listen to the 
grievances of the common man. The crisis foreseen by Gapon 
came at the end of 1904. The agitation among the professional 
men was beginning to communicate itself to the masses. The 
initial spark was the dismissal of four Putilov workmen named
^Michael Florinsky, End of the Russian Empire (New Haven1 
Yale University Press, 1931)# P« 11^8. (Hereinafter referred to 
as Florinsky, End Russian Empire)
9Federov, Sergunin, Subbotin, and Ukaiov at the end of December. 
These men were all members of the Assembly with many years of 
employment in the Putilov factory. Gapon assumed that their 
membership was the reason for their dismissal. In order to save 
credibility for the Assembly, Gapon tried to intercede for the 
dismissed men with the Putilov management, the local factory 
inspector and the governor-general of St. Petersburg. On behalf 
of the union and the dismissed men, Gapon demanded two things: 
reinstatement of the four workers; and removal of foreman 
Tetyankin whom the workers blamed for their dismissal.
The plant manager Smirnov insisted that there were no
grounds for grievances. He maintained that only Sergunin had
been dismissed for faulty work and that Subbotin had left of his
own accord. Ukaiov was to have been dismissed for unauthorized
absence but as he had promised to reform, he was still employed;
Federov was also still employed. In any case, Smirnov refused to
cooperate with Gapon because he stated that the Assembly of
St. Petersburg Factory Workers was not authorized to negotiate
with him. Rejecting Smirnov's statement, Gapon organized a strike
movement at the Putilov works in order to create additional
pressure on the management.
He had the faithful following, the ability to contrive 
and execute, and the self-confidence necessary for the 
role. Assuredly it was he who prompted the initial move 
of the Putilovites which led directly to the Assembly's 
taking on the implicit character of a labor union and to
^George A. Gapon, The Story of My Life (London:
Chapman and Hall, Ltd., 1905)» PP* 1^2-1^3. (Hereinafter 
referred to as Gapon, Story of.)
10
its transformation into a quasi-revolutionary body.1 
By January3,' 1905 'all the thirteen thousand Putilov workers were 
onostrike. Soon the only occupants of the factory were the two 
agents of the secret police. Though some historians claim that 
Gapon was a secret government agent, the fact is that he eschewed 
his duty as a priest and as an agent of the government when he 
did not stop the strike. Also, he took leadership of the strike 
and turned a limited, plant-wide strike with no economic demands
i
into one that not only made economic demands but also provided
1 ;
the jimpetus for a general strike.
I (Japon and the strikers broadened the demands of the workers
to includei 1. an eight hour day; 2. increased daily wage from
60 Kopecks to 100 Kopecks for men; 3« increased wage from kO
Kopecks to 75 Kopecks for women; improved sanitary facilities; 
5. provision for free medical aid; 6, immediate convocation of a
constituent assembly; 7. establishment of personal liberties;
\
8. an| end to the war with Japan; and 9« amnesty for political 
exiles. As the strike lengthened, the strikers' demands became 
more extensivei MLet all be free and equal. And to this end let 
the election of the members to the Constituent Assembly take 
place in conditions of universal, secret and equal suffrage.**2 
j The workers made further political and economic demandsi 
1. universal and compulsary education; 2. freedom of the press;
I '
3# separation of church and state; 4. replacement of indirect
^Harcave, First Blood, p. 73.
p
Kochan, Rev, in Russia, p. 76•
11
taxation with progressive income tax; 5* equality before the 
law; 6. transfer of land to the people; and ?. abolition 
factory inspectors to end oppression. Pushed to a point of 
desperation, the strikers felt: "There are only two paths for us; 
either freedom and happiness, or the grave. Let our life be a 
sacrifice to agonizing Russia. We will not grudge this sacrifice, 
we gladly give it..”^
The strike steadily increased and spread. By the middle of 
the week of January 3rd some 25»000 workers all over St. Peters­
burg were on strike--all making practically the same demands as 
the Putilov workers..
!At first the strike aroused little outside concern. The
Minister*of Interior, Svyatopolk-Mirsky, was seemingly unconcerned.
i
The Minister of Finance. Kakovtsev, who controlled the factory
i
inspection system and received reports of the workers' doings, 
apparently saw no reason for alarm, but he did report the strike
t
to. the\ Czar. The minister pointed out the illegality of the 
strike, , He did not express any anticipation of serious diffi­
culties in righting matters. Thus informed, the Czar did not 
react very forcefully:
"A clear, frosty day," the tsar wrote in his diary entry 
for 8 January. "There was much activity and many reports. . . 
went for a long walk. Since yesterday all the factories 
and shops in St. Petersburg have been on strike. Troops 
have been brought in from surroundings to strengthen the 
garrison. The workers have conducted themselves calmly 
hitherto. Their number is estimated at 120,000. At 
the head of the workers' union some priest-— socialist 
Gapon. Mirsky came in the evening with a report of the
-^Kochan, Russia in Rev. , p. 78*
12
measures taken."
Others of the bureaucracy were slow in recognizing the
potential threat of the strike movement as it picked up momentum.
Harcave described the situation*
St. Petersburg Prefect Fullon and the police seemed to be 
guided by the assurance that Gapon*s leadership v/as to be 
trusted as the surest means of handling the strikers.
They had become convinced that he alone could keep the 
discontented workers of the Assembly from going over to the 
revolutionaries. And even after the strike began to spread 
and it became evident that Gapon was set on his maverick 
course, ignoring his superiors in both church and govern­
ment and actually promoting the strike movement, General 
Fullon held to a laissez-faire policy toward him, fearing 
that opposition or restraint might drive him to release 
his followers to the revolutionary camp and thus confront 
the police with a force they would be unable to handle..
Meanwhile, Gapon had been scurrying back and forth among 
worker groups encouraging and rousing the strikers. He carried 
with him the petition which set forth their appeals, encouraging 
the workers to sign it and present it as a direct appeal to the 
Czar.^ The strikers were busy themselves encouraging the other 
workers to join in the fraternity of strikers. The promotional 
methods of the strikers were very effective. By January 7# the 
industrial life of St. Petersburg was almost immobilized. All 
but 25*000 of the city*s 1?5»000 workers were out. These strikers 
were becoming convinced that they should appeal to their Czar for 
justice.
1Ibid., p. 79 
2
Harcave, First Blood, p. 77. 
See Appendix A.
13
Gapon and his lieutenants were accomplishing the final 
touches on the plan to have tens of thousands of St. Petersburg 
workers and their'families participate in a march. The workers 
felt that the march would make their dream come true? that is, 
their “Little Father* would accept their humble requests in his 
all-knowing justice. These simple workers did not fully under­
stand the implications of the requests as presented in Gapon's
i
petition. Harcave points out this naivete on the part of the 
worker^i
j ' . . .
That most of the strikers had any clear understanding of 
the petition that they were preparing to present or that 
they ever consciously aspired to the political changes 
requested in it is most doubtful. They were discontented, 
to be sure, and bound by conditions that promoted despera­
tion, as the rapid spread of the strike showedj but, for
the| most part, they still shared the average Russian
wjorker's unconcern with political aims and were, in fact, 
generally antipathetic to political discussions. Their 
signing the document was, for the majority of them, only 
a manifestation of faith in their revered leader. • • • 
However, to say that Gapon was taking advantage of his 
followers' credulity and loyalty by promoting a liberal 
program disguised in monarchical terms, assuredly 
acceptable to them, would be unfair. As far as can be
jiidged, he saw no illogic in the scheme he proposed. He
apparently believed sincerely that, • . ., he himself 
could use his influence to guide the present Romanov.1
By January 7$ the officials finally became aware that 
action was no longer avoidable. The Minister of Interior 
Svyatopolk-Mirsky and chief of St. Petersburg Prefect Fullon
i
ordered troops. They still did not inform the Czar of any
i
serious troublet nor did they try to deal with the source of the
. 1
potential trouble or try to check its development. When Gapon
^Harcave, First Blood, p. 82.
Ik
Informed the government of the impending march of the workers
and their families on January 8, he underlined the peaceful
nature of the march and asked that the Czar receive him at the
Winter Palace so that he could present the workers* petition*
Gapon sent a message stating that*
Say to the emperor that I, together with thousands of 
people of Russia, am irrevocably resolved to proceed to 
the Winter palace at lio'clock p.m. Sunday, January 22, 
in order that he may show his faith by deeds and not by 
manifestos. Let him come as the true emperor to his 
people to receive our petition. Otherwise the moral  ^
bound between the emperor and the people may be broken.
Even then, the Czar was not told of the march nor that his
presence had been requested. Instead, Gapon*s arrest was ordered
by Svyatopolk-Mirsky. Prefect Fullon did not carry out the
arrest, fearing a greater turmoil if Gapon were apprehended.
Instead the officials prepared to meet an illegal march with
forcei
After the event, it seemed that the tactics they agreed 
upon were those that would result in the greatest shedding 
of blood and therefore, presumably, Insure the most lasting 
intimidation. • . • They made no adequate effort to reach 
the workers* leaders, to demand that the instructions for 
march^be rescinded, or to check in any other way the 
anticipated action before it should require forcible re­
straint.2
The workers did not expect any violence. It was unthink­
able to them that the Czar would use force against his subjects 
while they were in the act of presenting a humble petition to him.
*Sunday World Herald. Omaha, Nebraska, January 22, 1905, 
front page.
2
Harcave, First Blood, p. 85.
The resulting massacre was therefore all the more shocking.^
”No figures give the precise numbers of killed and wounded.
2There may well have been more than a thousand.” Though the 
figures vary, the fact remains that this bloody deed was horrible
in the eyes of the world.
'1
j The massacre is more completely described in Chapter III. 
2
, Kochan, Rev, in Russia, p. 78.
CHAPTER III.
FATHER GAPON
When Bloody Sunday is considered in any frame of reference, 
it is necessary to consider what kind of man Father George Gapon 
was, what role he played in the massacre, and what effect he had 
on Americans.
Father Gapon was born in 1870 in a small town called Biliki 
in the province of Poltava in South Russia.^ Born of peasant 
parents, Gapon was nevertheless destined for world-wide notoriety.
His parents were encouraged to allow their son George to go to 
school beyond the normal levels expected of boys who worked as 
shepherds. After completing the local village school, Gapon was 
sent by his parents to the Poltava Ecclesiastical Seminary.
During his time at the Poltava Seminary, Gapon tutored
priests1 children and saw ”. . .  that there was much Parisaism among
them. Not only did they not sacrifice their own comfort for the weal
r>
of the people, but they were often positive leeches, . . . ."Because
^-Lionel Kochan, Russia in Revolution 1890-1918 (London:
Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1966), p^  72. In the January 25, 1905 
issue of the Times magazine on page two, an article claims he was 
born in 1869* Gapon does not give a date in his autobiography.
One would tend to put greater credence In-Kochan*s datre.
^Father George A. Gapon, The Story of My Life (London:
Chapman and Hall, Ltd., 1905), 19• (Hereinafter referred to as
Story of.
he was disenchanted with the clergy, Gapon ". . .concluded . . . 
(he) was xmfit for the priesthood."1 This disenchantment caused 
him to drop out of the Poltava Seminary. This action caused him
i
to be barred from other universities. He thought that he might
become a medical doctor to satisfy his personal need to help
people. But before he pursued this new ambition, he met a woman
who convinced him that he could do more for the masses by being in
the priesthood. In his autobiography he explains:
When I objected that my principles did not coincide with 
the teachings of the Orthodox Church, she replied that 
that was no sufficient objection; the main thing was to 
be true, not to the Orthodox Church, but to Christ, who 
was a model of sacrifice for Humanity. As to the symbols 
and ritual of the Church, they were symbols and ritual 
only.
This convinced me; I determined to become a priest, 
and she agreed to marry me. 2
Gapon became a priest and served in Poltava for four years, 
during which time he tried to get into the Ecclesiastical Academy 
in St. Petersburg. After much perseverance and frustration, he 
got a scholarship to the Academy, but was immediately disappointed 
with the caliber of the instruction. Feeling that all of the 
teachers were pedagogic, he became disgusted with the system:
1
Gapon, Story of, p. 20. The Times article referred to on 
the page before, says that he was expelled because he was a 
liberal. At any rate, Gapon did drop out of Poltava Ecclesias­
tical Seminary. i
2 1Ibid., p. 23. Gapon does not give his wife's name in his
autobiography. Since the book was published in 1905# he may have
been protecting her family. Throughout the account, Gapon rarely
referred to dates. After being married four years, his wife died
leaving him with two children —  a boy and a girl. The children
went to his wife's parents after her death. No records which
were consulted mentioned what happened to them.
The clever and. 'earnest (students) felt unable to stand 
the strifling CsicQ atmosphere in which the Russian 
Church is placed, and by such continuous sifting, few, 
except the ignorant, incapable, or depraved, are left 
for the Church.^
However, his determination to become an ordained priest enabled
Gapon to complete the program.
After ordination as a priest, Gapon was assigned to the
chaplaincy of the St. Petersburg prison. He also worked for the
church which was attached to one of two Orphanages of the Blue
Cross in the workmen's quarter. In addition, Gapon taught the
Bible in the Olga Poor House (which was under the patronage of the
Empress). On his regular rounds, Gapon passed a place called
Haven Field. It was an area for "unfortunates" who were outcasts
from their society, and for the poor people of St. Petersburg.
Gapon felt badly about their unhappy existence but he ". . . had
2no idea of attempting to assist in the reformation of society." 
However, the more he learned of the life of the poor people, the 
more he began to think of how to help them. Consequently, he went 
to the Prefect of St. Petersburg —  General Kleggells, to ask to 
be allowed to set up a program to help these outcasts. Gapon's 
idea was to have labor houses for regeneration of the outcasts. 
Outcasts would have to choose a colony to enter, where they would 
have to work. Through work would come their regeneration.
Gapon submitted his idea to the Prefect but it was never pre 
sented to the Empress, who was the head of the poor houses.
Gapon, Story of, p.
2Ibld.. p. 63.
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i
Though Gapon was not able to help the poor in his first 
attempt at a formalized program, he did begin to change his view­
points on how to help them. He became familiar with workmen who 
had political ideas. He did not at that time think that political 
change was necessary. He told the workmen that by some industrial 
organization they might reach better results for their own eleva­
tion than by entbering into conflict with the Government. However, 
the more he became aware of how the Government turned a deaf ear 
to the pleas of 'the common man, the more convinced he became that 
some steps needed to be taken for or by the workmen. The workmen 
showed him that some political action could !and should be taken.
It was not a case, . . . , of propaganda among the
workmen by an educated person, but rather,: on the
contrary, the workmen who moved me to a perception 
of how alone their needs could be satisfied. I
began to see what a tremendous influence it might be
for the amelioration of the conditions of labor in 
Russia if this large body of workmen could be com­
bined and taught how to protect their own interests, r-
During the time he was priest for the church in St. Peters­
burg, Gapon also formed an opinion which was to be very important
in a decision he was to make later while working with the organ­
ized workmen. In St. Petersburg he met Princess Elizabeth 
Norishkin, who had been a nursemaid to Czar Nicholas. She gave 
Gapon an idealized view of the emperor. She convinced Gapon that
Nicholas was a good, kind, honest man, although she did say he was
unfortunately, very weak-willed and devoid of any strength of 
character. From this, Gapon conceived the notion that Nicholas
iGapon, Story of, p. 77*
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was an Ideal Czar who'had not had an opportunity of showing his 
real worth. He felt the Czar was the only salvation of the Russian 
people. Beginning to believe that the day would come when the Czar 
would be able to rise to any situation, Gapon developed the belief 
that Nicholas would eventually listen to the voices of his people 
and would help to create a situation which could make them happy. 
Obviously, this concept of the Czar affected Gapon's decision to 
appeal to Nicholas during the strike in January of 1905. Tragi­
cally, Gapon*s ill-conceived concept of the Czar was very far 
from accurate.
Meanwhile, during the development of a prejudiced notion of 
the good-heartedness of Nicholas, Gapon was becoming increasingly 
dissatisfied with the governmental attempts to help the disadvan­
taged common man. He openly criticized these attempts and found 
himself in his second encounter with the police. Anitchkoff tried 
to get him fired. He renounced Gapon as a-revolutionist to the 
Central Department of the Political Police, but he was cleared by 
a police official named Mikhailoff who told Gapon that he was in 
sympathy with him and gave a favorable report to the Metropolitan 
Chief, Antonius. Mikhailoff also took Gapon to see M. Sergius 
Vasilivitch Zubatoff, the chief of the political section of the 
Department of Police.
Zubatoff tried to convince Gapon that his one object in life 
was to help the working man. Saying that he realized Gapon had 
this as his aim also, Zubatoff asked Gapon to work with the police 
to set up a7workman's society which could be closely guided and 
watched by the-government. Gapon reacted carefully. He told
21
Zubatoff that he didn't want to get involved. Slowly Gapon
realized what Zubatoff wanted  to organize the factory workers
in an association under the supervision and direction of the 
Secret Police. Gapon began to see the association as a trap 
constructed by the police in order to separate the working classes 
from the intellectuals and thus kill the political movement.
Zubatoff tried to convince Gapon that the workingmen should 
bb organized because they had a Czar who as an autocrat could 
play the part of the balance of power between the working men and 
the autocracy.. Zubatoff insisted that the Czar had been influ-
i
enced by men in the upper class who were convincing Nicholas to 
make policies which were to the benefit of these upper class men.
i *■
He insisted that the workingmen had an obligation to organize
i
themselves so that they could have enough power to exert an 
influence on the Emperor and help him to be more impartial and 
make policies more beneficial to the whole nation.
Zubatoff's implication that the Czar was simply misguided 
had some effect upon Gapon. However, he felt that a constitution­
al monarchy would be a better answer to setting up a system where­
by the interests of all groups ofjthe nation would be considered. 
Professing to be a constitutionalist, Zubatoff maintained that the 
change could not come about veryisoon. He objected to the 
students and other intellectuals influencing the workmen. He 
wanted a man like Gapon to help organize the workmen because 
Gapon would be much more "impartial." Trying to explain his 
point to Gapon, Zubatoff said:
22 '*
The intellectual classes are only agitating for their 
own political purposes; all they want is to get 
political power for themselves, using the workmen 
merely as tools, and we must struggle against this 
selfishness and this duping of simple people.
Gapon was not convinced that the Revolutionists, including 
intellectuals and students, worked with ulterior motives. How­
ever, he did not argue with Zubatoff* *'I did not argue any more 
for fear of betraying my sympathy with the heroic figures of the 
Russian Revolutionary Movement, of whose deeds I had heard much 
from my own workmen."^ He was also not convinced yet that he 
shojild; work for Zubatoff because he did not trust the man.
In 1903 Gapon decided that the police were trying to divert
the ;pe
1
grovith 
coul
ople's attention from political ideas and to kill any 
of a true labor movement. At that time he decided that he 
d not in good conscience Join Zubatoff's movement. Deciding 
to be actively against Zubatoff*s plan, Gapon wrote a report
which explained that the plan would demoralize people in the
<
laboi* movement and he advocated instead a free and independent
i
unioh similar to those which were found in England. After he 
sent his report to the police Metropolitan Chief Antonius and to 
Kleggells, Zubatoff redoubled his efforts to get Gapon's coopera- 
t ion.
j Gapon went to more meetings with Zubatoff because he was 
curibus to see what Zubatoff could do for him. He began to think
^Gapon, Story of, p. 84. 
^Ibld., p . 85•
that perhaps he could use Zubatoff's cooperation to accomplish 
his own desires for the working man. Gapon felt that the 
situation was becoming more miserable for the people under 
increasingly oppressive measures of the Government. Some action 
needed to be taken to help the people, and gradually Gapon began 
to think that he could pretend to adhere to Zubatoff's policy 
while actually working towards his own purpose of setting up a 
genuine working-class organization.
Although nothing ever came of Gapon's idea, this incident is 
important in that it explains why Gapon ever cooperated with the 
police against the people. However, it is the opinion of this 
writer/researcher that Gapon only "used” the police to suit his 
own ends —  i.e., helping his fellow man.
At first Gapon felt that he should give up the priesthood to 
help the workmen. Then he decided that he could have a more 
effective communication channel to the workmen if he remained a 
priest in St, Petersburg. As a priest, Gapon had the opportunity 
of coming into close contact with the workmen. Finally Gapon 
came to a decision. He developed a plan for influencing the 
Workmen's Association organized by Zubatoff in such a way as to 
completely paralyze the efforts of the Political Police, to use it 
as a buttress of the Autocracy, and to direct it into an alto­
gether different channel. He had no faith left in the genuiness 
of Zubatoff's intentions, and had therefore, decided to use the 
prefect for his own purposes.
He determined to organize the workers for mutual help under 
the protection of the authorities. But, at the same time he
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would set up secret Societies of hand-picked workmen to educate
as “missionaries” to convert the whole organization to a true
labour movement. He wanted to groom these men so that they
could replace the police appointed officials of the union.
Realizing that he could and probably would be criticized for his
seeming collaboration with the police, Gapon decided to go ahead
and set up the labour association.
Gapon must have felt that he might be condemned for
cooperating with the police even if to accomplish his own aims,
for in his book Story of My Life he seems compelled to sayi
The reader who is calmly considering this story in 
the light of the peaceful and law-abiding feelings of 
a citizen of a free land may wonder that I should 
have consented any longer to associate myself, even 
in so slight a way, with so dubious a venture as this, 
now that I began to see its real nature. But, filled 
as I was with disgust, the more I saw of Zubatoff*s 
movement, the peculiar and desperate character of the 
position of the mass of my poor countrymen still more 
painfully oppressed me. The very existence of this 
movement shows how little Russian conditions can be 
judged by Western standards. In no other civilized 
country, I suppose, would it be possible to con­
ceive the heads of police, with the patronage and 
authority of the most powerful Ministers of the 
Sovereign, deliberately undertaking to organize a 
labour movement, and even going so far as to organize 
strikes, solely with the object of “dishing” the 
natural leaders of the working classes, and so keeping 
the industrial movement under their own control.
It was clear to me that my countrymen would 
never be in better conditions of life until they were 
organized; and it appeared to me —  and this belief 
has been confirmed by what has since happened —  
that, whoever commenced that organization, it would 
in the end become a genuine labour movement, because 
the intelligent members of the working classes who 
had been enlisted would ultimately get the upper 
hand. That is why, after much anxious thought, I 
decided that, distasteful as it might be, I ought to 
take part in this beginning and to endeavor, using 
Zubatoff as a tool, gradually to get control of the 
organization into my own hands. By affecting to help
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these servants'of the Autocracy I should get complete 
freedom in my relations with the working men, and I 
should not be under the perpetual necessity of hiding 
my movements from police spies. ^
In 1903, Zubatoff died leaving Gapon in a somewhat un­
certain position with the workers' association. However, in 
August of 1903 five members from a secret committee Gapon had set 
up earlier asked Gapon to take full control of the association. 
Agreeing readily, Gapon started to organize the men into the 
"Gathering of Russian Factory Hands of St. Petersburg.” He began 
to condition the workers to think in terms of how real progress
j
coujld be made toward the improvement of working conditions for the
Umasses.
I !
j On April 11, 1904 the opening ceremony of the St. Petersburg 
Factjory Workers' Society took place. Gapon felt that this 
occurrence gave him a firm base from which to begin his work. He 
formed circles to study industrial and political questions. To 
listen to Gapon it sounds as if he was a modern-day union presi-i
'S
dent j
j I had often to go to the managers of the factories 
and workshops to ask for some improvement in the 
conditions of labour, to smooth over some undesirable 
conflict, to find work for unemployed hands, or to 
get some unfortunate man reinstated.^
In May of 1904 Gapon attempted to organize the thirteen 
thousand workers of the Putiloff Works in St. Petersburg. He sent
i '1
j Gapon, Story of, p. 102. This long quotation is included 
to produce the effect of a voice from the past. This passage seems 
to create the feeling that Gapon is talking directly to the reader.
I 2
; Ibid.. pp. 117-118
his trained men among the Putiloff workers to stir up interest in 
an organization for the workman. At the end of May, fifty of the 
Putiloff workers asked Gapon to organize a society among them 
similar to the St. Petersburg Factory Workers* Society. Gapon 
gave up his chairmanship of the parent organization to become 
chairman of the Putiloff association. By the end of June, 190^ 
there; were seven hundred members of the new branch. In June, the 
police once again asserted their supposed control over Gapon and 
thus over the association. They offered Gapon a large sum of 
money for his society. Suspecting that the police were attempt-
lngj to implicate him in a collaboration, Gapon took the money and
' 1
entered it into accounts as an' anonymous gift. He took the money
! ' ! ■ ■ ■ - ■  
so tha|t the police would not doubt his sincerity.
I
-Word of the new workers* societies spread in St. Petersburg. 
Bequests came to open new branches. By November, 190^ eleven new 
branches had been opened. By the time of the strike in January 
ther'e were twenty thousand members in the society.* One matter
. i
which influenced the workmen to join the society was the war in 
Manchuria with Japan. At first the workmen, though not showing 
much interest in the Russian campaign, were sympathetic with its 
cause. As the war progressed, the workers* attitudes changed 
because of all the abuses, and corruption in the navy and the army. 
Reports of defeat of the Russian troops caused the workingmen to
I
oppose the war and added to their distrust of the Czar and his
advisors. This feeling of the workmen was indicative of the
|
i 1
Gapon, Story of, p. 130.
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growing dissatisfaction among the workmen toward many prevalent 
conditions in their society.
Included, in this growing workmen dissatisfaction was 
increasing bitterness toward the way they were treated by the 
management in the factories. Gapon saw the role of his society as 
a protector of these workmen; he saw the society's role as one of 
mediatpr between management and laborers.^ At the end of December, 
190^s four workmen were dismissed from the Putilov factory. Two
j
of the I workers had been working at the Putilov factory for twelve
i .  i .
yearls; the other two had been employed for seven years. The 
.society did not feel that there was any justification for the
i •
dismissal and Gapon suspected they were released simply because 
they^belonged to his society of workmen.
At first he thought that the men would be reinstated; but 
when they were not, he decided that the society would have to 
take action.
s■j
j Gapon conceived the idea that the workmen should go directly 
to thb Czar. The workers, with their wives and children, would 
march to the Winter Palace. There they would plead their cause 
and present their grievances to the highest authority. Gapon1s 
mistaken conception of a mis-guided but well-meaning Czar was 
the basis of this decision and he convinced the workmen that if
j
they could reach the "Little Father” over the heads .of the police­
men, cpfficials, foremen, factory inspectors, governors and
■ 1; In his book Sidney Harcave expresses great doubt over Gapon's 
sincerity. He says: "Of the primary sources, the fullest is Gapon's
The Story of My Life. . . . " Harcave, First Blood: The Russian 
Revolution of 190 5 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 196^), pT 59* 
(Hereinafter referred to as First Blood.)
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factory-owners, the Czar would right the wrongs against the work­
men .
. Gapon, aided by some sympathizers, drew up a petition for
/
presentation to the Czar. This document showed the Russian 
workers' sense of exclusion from society.^ It complained that 
the government had been abused by bureaucracy and was headed into 
ruin and maintained that Russia needed popular representation to 
save it from catastrophe.
Meanwhile Gapon gave notice of the demonstration to the 
minister of the interior, Svyatopolk-Mirsky, and to the Czar. He 
emphasized its peaceful nature and implored the Czar to receive 
the petition. Gapon did not know that the Czar was at his winter 
palace with his family. No response came. Instead Gapon's 
arrest was ordered. Gapon ignored the warrant, spending the days 
immediately preceding the projected march, haranguing meetings of 
the workers. He tried to assure them that the Czar would listen 
to them. However if he did not, Gapon vowed that in such case,
". . . for us there is no tsar." He warned that if there was no 
reform from the Czar, the state of Russia was at a point where 
there would inevitably be a revolution that would last for years 
and involve great bloodshed.
I
j
While spending the last night before the march in the French 
quarter of the Narvskaya Zastava, Gapon and his followers heard 
the disturbing preparations of the soldiers organizing for the
1
See Appendix A for a copy of the petition.
march. The sinister sound of the soldiers marching with fixed 
bayonets and the cossacks passing on horseback contrasted to the 
muted praying of the people preparing for the march. When Gapon 
heard the soldiers® preparation, he decided that It would be wise 
to give the demonstration a religious tone and therefore, ordered 
that icons be carried in the march and religious chants be sung.
;The people were not aware of the dangers which awaited them. 
Large posters had invited the workmen to join the procession.
They had hung for two days with no police interference. People 
began to believe that the police were not going to interfere in
'  i
any iway and thus they prepared to come out In great numbers.
i
! ihe day of January 22, 1905 dawned cold and crisp in
i |
St. Petersburg, Russia. Father George Gapon led the column from
I . - i
Hall in his priest's robes. Behind him came a crowd of 
about twenty thousand people, men and women, young and old. They 
all marched bareheaded, . . full of the simple intention of
seeing their Sovereign in order, as one of them said, 'to cry out
■ ! . 2 
theirj griefs like children on the breast of their father.'"
: The plan was that all groups would form columns and begin to
march at different times, depending on the distance of their
gathering places. The hope was that all groups would meet in the
square in front of the Czar's Winter Palace at two o'clock in the! '
j'
afterhoon.
i
|These marchers/protestors were met by over twenty thousand
1
See Appendix B for a picture of Gapon.
2
Gapon, Story of, p. 179.
Cossacks commanded, by eight major-generals, in addition to the 
police detailed for the day's operation. The crowd was ordered to 
clear the way.* After the warnings, the Cossacks marched on the
i .
2crowds, slashing as they did so.
The order was then given for the soldiers to open fire.
According to one account, the soldiers gave warning shots, but 
when this action did not disperse the crowd, the men fired into 
the crowds.
The scene resulting from the execution of that order 
was to become etched into the minds of the Russian
people as the one, above all others of this tragic
Sunday, that represented the brutal injustice under 
which they lived. It was to be described over and 
over with embellishments and much bitter vindic­
tiveness. 3
Gapon fell to the ground to avoid being hit. The rest of 
the crowd first kneeled and then lay flat. When Gapon got up he 
was apalled by the scene of the massacre. There are various 
statements of the number killed; Gapon said that there were 
between six hundred and nine hundred killed, and at least five 
thousand wounded. Other accounts claim up to four thousand dead.
After the first of the shooting, Gapon*s friends forced him 
to flee from the debacle. Through a series of exciting events, 
he made his escape to Germany and eventually to England. From 
London, Gapon prophesied in his autobiography - the primary source
*Harcave, First Blood, p. 89.
2
There is disagreement between secondary sources and Gapon's 
report. Appendix C gives Gapon's account from his book.
3
Ibid., p. 92
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dealing with Bloody Sunday —  that the results of this “Bloody 
Sunday" would be a major revolution!
1 may say therefore, with certainty, that the 
struggle is quickly approaching its inevitable 
climax; that Nicholas IX is preparing for himself 
the fate which befell a certain English King and 
a certain French King long ago, and that such 
members of his dynasty as escape unhurt from the 
throes of the revolution may, on some day in the 
not very distant future, find themselves exiled 
upon some distant shore.
Gapon’s prophesy became eerily accurate as history recorded. 
At the time of the massacre, the world could not foresee coming 
events, it could only react with horror and shock to the Bloody 
Sunday massacre. In the United States Gapon was viewed as a 
saint and many magazines and newspapers carried accounts describ­
ing Gapon and his character. The New York Times of January 23* 
1905 asserts on the front page that Gapon was the fearless leader 
of the march and maintains that Gapon master-minded the strike 
like a genius. In the February 16, 1905 issue of the magazine 
Independent, Gapon is described as a ". . . remarkable man" and 
an " . . . excellent ecclesiastic." He is described as a dedicated 
priest who devoted his life to helping his fellow man. Gapon is 
lauded as the prime mover of the creation of the "Union of the 
Workingmen." It was Gapon who led the people who " . . .  did not 
hesitate to sacrifice themselves in the cause of liberty."
1
Gapon, Story of. p. 255*
2
Vladimer Bienstock, "Father Gapon," Independent,
February 16, 1905, pp. 351-353.
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The February 4, 1905 Issue of the magazine Outlook compares
Gapon to Tolstoy:
Father Gapon, like Tolstoy, has an indestructible 
faith in the moral force of man. . . . Father 
Gapon calls men to action, in the name of God 
certainly, but always to action, even through the 
force of arms. . . .  The political teachings of 
Father Gapon, which are strong and clear in 
matters of principle and modest as to practical 
questions, show us that this man has already ^
reached the threshold of conscious Socialism. . . .
By March of 1905» an author is saying of Gapon that the
people of Russia regard Gapon as a ". . . deliverer half-divine."
The author feels that these people's faith ". . . is ignorance
2yearning for a great man, making a God of a simple priest."
According to some authorities, Gapon's total role and
complete involvement in the Bloody Sunday affair is still not
accepted as clearly explained. In spite of the literature about
Gapon, some researchers would say that Gapon did work for the
1 police trying to counteract revolutionary influences among the 
3workmen. Whatever the truth of the matter, it cannot be denied 
that Gapon played an enormously important role in the Revolution of 
1905 in Russia. He was very successful in dealing with the work­
men. Though his ambition and self-confidence led him on irregular 
paths and though his actions sometimes seemed ambiguous, there is
1
Catherine Breshovsky, "Who Is Father Gapon?" Outlook 
February 1905, p. 269.
^Poole, "Father Gapon," Outlook, March, 1905» P* 685.
3
Michael Florinsky, End of the Russian Empire, (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1931), p. 1172.
no reliable evidence to prove him dishonest or disloyal to his
ideals. "He was a man deeply interested in the conditions of
labor, sympathetically affected by the injustices he saw, and
1
sincerely dedicated to their correction." Gapon obviously played 
a great part in the drama of January 22, 1905 acted out in 
St. Petersburg, Russia.
After January 22, 1905. Gapon issued a denunciation of the 
Czar, the bureaucracy and the army. He published his autobiography 
which defended his actions as being sincere in his attempt to help 
improve the conditions of the workmen. He was unfrocked by the
chuiich1 in March, 1905. When he fled from Russia, he joined the
L ISocialist Revolutionary Party. After he had returned to Russia, 
Gapon lias forced once again to flee —  this time to Finland. In 
March of 1906, Gapon was hanged by order of P. Eutenberg of the 
Socialist Revolutionary Party because the revolutionaries believed 
that he had collaborated with the police In 1905* Thus ended the 
controversial career of the main actor in the first act of the
i-
Russian Revolution.
;i
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CHAPTER IV
AMERICAN REACTION
The American reaction to Bloody Sunday differed according
to thelvarious sectors of its society. The official United States
i
reaction was slight; it can be assumed that the reason lay in the
fact; that President Theodore Roosevelt was deeply involved in
i ;
tryipg ito negotiate a peace agreement between Russia and Japan.
v  i
Theodore Roosevelt had become President upon the death of
i ! ■ ■ ■ ■ ' * ■
William; McKinley in 1901. According to Foster Dulles, he had
r1
scorn for Russia. President Roosevelt was angry because he felt 
that the.Russian diplomats had lied to him while organizing China 
against American interests. Secretary of State John Hay distrusted
the Russians also. In July, 1903 President Roosevelt wrote to
\
Secretary Hay that: "I have not the slightest objection to the
Russians knowing that I feel thoroughly aroused and irritated at
1their conduct in Manchuria;. . . ."
Roosevelt believed Russia's internal affairs were crucial 
to her future power. He was well-informed about Russia's internal 
problems:
. . the weakness of her government, the distress of her 
people, the revolutionary forces at work there. Spring Rice 
wrote . . . long, often indiscreet letters from the British
j^Foster Rhea Dulles. The Road to Teheran (Princeton: Yale
Press), p. 86.
3^
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Embassy in St. Petersburg; and. later his own ambassador 
George Meyer in European Russia and a young State Department 
official, Williard Straight, in Asiatic Russia kept the 
President informed. . • 1 There is much about the Russians
which I admire,* he (Roosevel© wrote a year before the 
revolution of 1905, 'and I believe in the future of the Slavs 
if they can only take the right turn. But I do not believe 
in the future of any race while it is under a crushing 
. despotism. . . .
Roosevelt exerted great influence on the U.S. governmental 
view of Russia and its affairs with that country. As one historian 
summarizes;
With Theodore Roosevelt's reelection in November 1904, and 
the steady decline in health and finally the death of John Hay 
in July 1905f the President became not only his own secretary 
of state for foreign affairs, but "his own cabinet," if not 
in fact the Government of the United States personified.
Dennett states that Congress had no part in government, that 
senators were seldom consulted, and that the Cabinet made 
few contributions.2
In 1898-1899 Roosevelt wrote to Spring Rice that the
Russians were a serious problem. "'. . . if not for our generation,
at least to the generations which will succeed us. I look upon
them as a people to whom we can give points, and a beating; a
people with a great future as we have; but a people with poisons
3
working in it. , . . By 1904 Russian interests were challenging 
United States interests in the Far East. In February of 1904, 
Roosevelt wrote to Spring Rice that he had "'. . • a strong liking
Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and, the Rise of America 
to World Power (New Xorki Collier Books, 1968), p. 232. (Here in-
after referred to as T.R. and Rise of America.)
E.H. Zabriskie, American Russian Rivalry in the Far East, 
1895-1914 (Philadelphia* University of Pennsylvania Press, 1946), 
p. 110. (Hereinafter referred to as American Rivalry Far East.)
3
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and respect for the Russians, but unless they change in some marked 
way they contain the chance of menace to the higher life of the
i
world. Our people have become suspicious of Russia and I personally 
share this view.'"^ Though Roosevelt felt antagonism toward Russia, 
circumstances were driving the United States to support them as the 
aggressive power of Japan was recognized.
In 1905» Roosevelt became increasingly irritated with Russia 
because they had sent him a letter of protest, charging China and 
Japan with neutrality violations. China, the letter claimed, had 
permitted Japan to use a part of the Liaotung Peninsula as a naval
base and had furnished Japan with cast iron. Russia, therefore,
\
claimed that she would be obliged to consider the neutrality of
China from the standpoint of her own interests. Roosevelt wrote
to Secretary Hay that:
It seems to me that if you present Rusia's protest about 
breach of neutrality to China, we would at the same time make 
a strong protest against Russia herself violating China*s 
neutrality, as reported in this morning's papers. I think 
we should seize the opportunity when the wolf invites outside 
interference against the lamb to call the wolf's attention 
sharply to his own misdeeds. It may possibly have a healthy 
affect in restraining him from a course of conduct that will 
cause us trouble hereafter.^
John Hay, however, sent a letter simply expressing the hope 
that neither belligerant would breach neutrality.
When the letters of Theodore Roosevelt from 1903-1905 are 
examined, It is found that he does not mention the Bloody Sunday
^Beale, T.R. and Rise of America, p. 231.
^Etting E. Morison, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1961), pT 1102. A letter of January 16, 1905 
to John Jay. (Hereinafter referred to as Letters of T.R.)
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massacre of January 22, 1905* Rather, he was very busy distrust­
ing the Japanese and the Russians while trying at the same time to 
settle their dispute. Holding no respect for the Russian Czar, 
he wrote: "Personally, I greatly admire the Russian people; but
I think the Russian government represents all that is worst, most 
insincere and unscrupulous, and most reactionary. . .
One reads in his letters that Theodore Roosevelt was concerned 
about the Russian loss of Port Arthur to the Japanese. Since 
this military incident took place prior to Bloody Sunday perhaps 
it took precedence over any domestic unrest in Russia, The naval 
defeat seems merely to have made Roosevelt aware of the United States
i  .
1
need for a more competent navy.
I Though Roosevelt does not write directly of the Bloody* Sunday, 
it might be assumed that such unspeakable actions on the part of
i
the Russian autocracy did not pass unnoticed. Writing to George 
Otto Trevelyan on March 9, 1905, Roosevelt stated:-
i
Meanwhile, when I realize most keenly the difficulties 
inherent under a free representative government in dealing 
with foreign questions, it is rather a comfort to feel that 
Russia, where freedom has been completely sacrificed, where 
the darkest and most reactionary tyranny reigns, has as yet 
been unable to do well in the exercise of these functions. . . .2
Roosevelt's disgust over Nicholas's tyranny seems to have given him
reluctance to settle the Russo/Japanese problem as he says: "I
wish the Japanese and Russians could settle it (the war) between
themselves, and I should be delighted to have anyone except myself
orison, Letters of T.R. , p. 1115. A letter of February 6, 1905 
to George Von Lengerke Meyer.
^Ibid., p. 1132. A letter of March 9, 1905 to Goerge Otto 
Trevelyan.
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give them a jog to settle it."! Later he expressed to John Jay
his growing contempt for Czar Nicholas?
Did you ever know anything more pitable than the condition 
‘ of the Russian despotism in this year of disgrace? The 
Czar is a prepostrous CgiQ little creature as the absolute 
autocrat of 150,000,000 people. He has been unable to make 
war and now he is unable to make peace.2
Roosevelt finally seems utterly disgusted with the Russians of
whom he wrote to Henry Cabot Lodges
Of course if the Russians go on as they have gone ever since 
I have been President. . . they are hopeless creatures with 
whom to deal. They are utterly insincere and treacherous; 
they have no conception of truth, no willingness to look facts 
in the face, no regard for others of any sort or kind, no 
knowledge of their own strength or weakness, and they are 
helplessly unable to meet emergencies.3
Whether or not the Russians were helpless to meet emergencies,
the American government did not react officially to the Bloody Sunday
occurrence. In the Papers Relating to'the Foreign Relations of
the United States for 1905. only one mention of.the Bloody Sunday
is found. The American ambassador Robert S. McCormick wrote to
the Secretary of State that the disturbance of the people of
St. Petersbug was meant to be peaceful.
The ambassador does not know whatt warning was given, but an 
eye-witness told him that an order to fire upon the crowd in 
the park was given. The crowd was partly composed of women 
and children, and he said some 60 persons were killed and 
wounded. At other points in the streets leading to the 
palace many were cut down by the Cossacks. A large number
^Morison, Letters of T.R., p. 1150, A letter of March 30,
1905 to John Jay.
2Ibid.. p. 1158. A letter of April 2, 1905 to John Jay.
3lbid., p. 1125* A letter of June 5. 1905 to Henry Cabot Lodge.
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is reported killed and wounded in the manufacturing district, _ 
but there is no reliable information as to the actual numbers.
If anything, the report to the Secretary seemed somewhat slanted
toward the Russian government's side of the issue*
A reliable eyewitness reported to him (JlcCormicQ that officers 
appealed to the crowd to disperse, calling attention to the 
posters displayed everywhere warning the public to keep off 
the streets and that their lives were in danger if they re­
mained; no notice seems to have been paid to this warning.
The crowd shoved the officers about and in some instances 
attacked them and tore their insignia from their uniforms and 
inflicted severe wounds with clubs. Quiet now prevails in 
the center of the city, which is cut off from the manufacturing 
districts by the troops.2
Ambassador McCormick's source seemed to be on the side of the
"establishment" as his information reflected the employers' views.
The report continued*
A large amount of socialistic literature was circulated among 
the workingmen, and a petition which was sent to His Majesty 
by them was not written by a Russian workingman, but a German 
socialist, as a large employer of labor informed him. A deep- 
seated discontent exists among the working class throughout 
the large towns, and yesterday's happenings will probably 
increase the antigovernment feeling and discontent with the 
present unhappy conditions.3
Further developments seemed to convince McCormick that the socialists
were involved in the strikes
There can be no doubt that for some time a socialist group has 
been at work among the operatives in St. Petersburg, as well as 
other manufacturing towns and cities of Russia. In spite of 
all precautions taken by the censorship great quantities of
1Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 
1905 (Washingtons Government Printing Office, 1906), p. ?62. 
(Hereinafter referred to as Papers Foreign Relations of U.S. 1905).
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
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socialistic literature have been sent across the border and 
widely distributed from St. Petersburg to Odessa in every town 
of any manufacturing importance. This has been going on for 
some years and the war and its accompanying conditions have 
been such as to bring this propaganda to its full fruition.1
0
Research has revealed that McCormick made the only'-direct mention
to the specific day of the Bloody Sunday massacre;
As far as I can hear, the authorities have the situation now 
in hand and no more serious outbreaks *are looked for except 
in Moscow, where to-day was fixed as a time for demonstrations 
similar to those in St. Petersburg on Sunday. . . .
It is exceedingly difficult to obtain any/information on 
what is transpiring outside of St. Petersburg, even in its 
suburbs, and tnerefore nothing available here upon which 
jtoiform an intelligent opinion as to how widespread is the 
ifeeling of discontent and unrest and how far-reaching its 
consequences may be.^
\ Ilhere does not seem to be any other official United States
I
mention, of Bloody Sunday. The next comment about Russia in the 
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1905
came on February 17, 1905* This was a mention of the assassination 
of the Grand Duke Sergius. To this type of incident, the President 
couldi react. Secretary Hay instructed McCormick to convey condolences■j _
on the Duke's death and the abhorrence of the act felt by the 
President and the Government of the United States. Perhaps neither 
the United States Government nor its President could afford to 
react to the despicable actions of the Russian government on Bloody 
Sunday. How could the United States Government communicate directly 
with j;he Russian people to explain to them any shock or horror it
i ■
felt about the actions of its nobility? On the other hand, neither
•^Papers Foreign Relations of U.S. 1905» p. 763.
2Ibid.
could the government officially chastise the Russian Czar for
unforgiveable behavior.u Because there was really no avenue of
protest open to'the Government, there was no official American
reaction to the Bloody Sunday massacre.
Though the American public could and did react to the massacre,
it reacted less to the Russo/Japanese war than the government had;
The public was only mildly aroused (over the war)*. . . . Editor­
ial writers and public speakers warned that the Muscovite 
Peril rather than the Yellow Peril was the real menace to 
Western Civilization. But for all these bellicose hints, the 
American people did not feel any.vital interests of theirs 
were at stake in Manchuria. They knew too little about it; 
it was too far away.
The shock of the massacre of Bloody Sunday, however, did hit the 
Americans closer to home. "'The Bloody Sunday1 produced a tremendous 
impression at home and abroad."
*■ Selected American newspapers were found to be full of horri­
fied reaction to'the massacre. For example, the New York Times 
magazine of January 23, 1905 asserts:
The sympathy of the middle classes is with the workmen.
Comment on the action of the troops and authorities is very 
bitter, and sarcastic remarks are made that officers are 
braver against the defenseless public than against the Japanese, 
and that "ammunition may be scarce in the Far East, but is too 
plent iful here."3
This same issue of the New York Times had front page headlines which
^Dulles, The Road to Teheran, p. 86. The same sentiment is 
expressed in Zabriskie's American Rivalry Far East, p. 112.
P
^Michael Florinsky, End of the Russian Empire, (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 19315, P» 1172. The same sentiment is expressed 
in Thomas A. Bailsy's, America Faces Russia: Russian-American Relations 
from Early Times to Our Day, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University
Press, 1950), p. 206.
^"Day of Terror in Czar's Capital," New York Times, January 23, 
1905, p. 1.
^2
blazed with indignation: DAY OF TERROR IN CZAR'S CAPITAL;
TROOPS SLAY WOMEN AND CHILDREN WITH MEN; WORKMEN FORCE GUARDS TOt
FIRE TO STOP THEM* BARRICADE IN THE STREETS. The Issue was full
of. articles about the massacre claiming that: "This has been a
1
day of unspeakable horror in St. Petersburg." A front page
article described in great detail the scene of the incident and
reported in full as much information as was known about the incident
at that time. The article included an eye-witness report of an
Associated Press correspondent who was at the scene. He described
a military camp atmosphere; he also discussed.the presentation of
the workmen's plea to the Czar. He described the scene of the
march. He explained that at 1:30 p.m. on January 22, 1905» an order
had come for the crowd to disperse. When no movement was made,
an order was issued to fire. After the smoke raised, the correspondent
saw mangled corpses of persons of all ages and both sexes lying
on the ground. He described a gory scene: "Great splashes and
ostreams of blood stained the snow." The writer continued to 
describe the struggle as: "A condition almost bordering on civil
war. . • • Russia will have a constitution or Emperor Nicholas 
will lose his head."^
In that same January 23rd issue of the New York Times, the 
newspaper reported on a speech by Justice William J. Gaynor of
■^"Day of Terror in Czar's Capital," New York Times, January 23. 1905
p. 1.
2
Ibid.
3Ibld.. p. 2.
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the Supreme Court who said that:
i . . . the Czar was the tool and victim of a corrupt and 
avaricious church and aristocracy, and that if the down­
trodden people of Russia did not end this rule the combined 
civilizations of the world would have to interpose. . . .
Cthe movement is) by far the most important event in the 
foreign politics of our time, and deserves every attention 
on the part of distant observers.!
Another New York Times article which contained comments
i
from Europe described how " 1. . . the 'Little Father* has become 
the murderer of the people and it remains with him to save the 
country from disaster. Even at the eleventh hour he may do so, 
but only by recognizing that autocracy has gone forever."*’ The 
New York Times continued to report on the Russian turmoil through 
the week. It reported the public's eagerness for news of the Russian 
problem. Futhermore, it speculated on the character of Father Gapon. 
Not much was known about Gapon, but one writer supported the 
priest's actionsj "I have never heard of Father Gapon, but I know 
now that he must be God's own man, since he took no weapon and met 
the Cossacks with nothing but a cross raised aloft."3 On January 24th, 
the newspaper was still using headlines such as: TROOPS OVERAWE
ST. PETERSBURG; MOSCOW WORKERS TAKE UP STRIKE; THREAT OF MORE BLOOD­
SHED IN ANCIENT CAPITAL; and RUSSIAN AUTHORITIES BEWILDERED BY
SITUATION.^ |
\mWm          .
1
"Day of Terror in Czar's Capital," New York Times, January 23, 
1905* p. 1.
2
"Europe Apprehensive of Russian Revolution." New York Times, 
January 23, 1905, p. 2.
3"Who is Father Gapon?" New York Times, January 23, 1905, p. 2.
4
Headlines, New York Times, January 24, 1905, P# 1.
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In its January 25th issue the New York Times contained five 
articles on the Russian situation ranging from a description of the 
massacre, to an article which described Father Gapon1s role and 
his life. By January 26, 27» and 28, the Times was beginning to 
report how the news of the massacre had spread over Russia and of 
the action that was being taken as a result of it. It reported 
that the Czar promised to help the workmen and that some measure 
of self-government might occur as a result of the wide-spread 
strike that had been ignited by Bloody Sunday.
Another perodical, a magazine called The Independent, reacted
to the Bloody Sunday by writing that* "The recent eruptions in
St. Petersburg and other centers of population in Russia and their
repression by methods so ruthless and bloody as to shock the con-,
science of the whole civilized world have focused attention upon
1the condition of the workers in Russian cities." The Independent
writers looked upon this incident, as the beginning of a great
social and political upheaval:
The slaughter of unarmed men, women and children by order of 
the Czar, for no other crime than that of peaceably assembling 
for the purpose of submitting to him a petition, has at last 
opened the eyes of the world to the fact that the Russian 
Government is an incorrigible Asiatic despotism. . . . It is 
universally conceded that without freedom of speech, without 
a free/press, without the right of assembly, without the right 
of petition, nothing short of a Revolution can rid the 
Russian people of brute force, typified by autocracy. . . . It 
was not until a few hundred despairing workmen erected barri­
cades in the streets of St. Petersburg that the newspaper
1
"Two Russian Workmen's Stories," The Independent, January 30, 
1905, P. 244.  K--
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correspondents announced the beginning of the Russian revolu­
tion.
The Independent writers expressed the belief that the uprising of
i  .
Bloody Sunday gave impetus to revolutionary propaganda in Russia
2as well as casting a fatal blow at the Czar and Czarism. Express­
ing the sentiment that the strike might have far-reaching effects 
on Russia, the Independent writers wrote that:
The 22nd of January is a day to be infinitely regretted, both 
on its own account and for what may follow. . . . the elements 
that entered on the stage on the 22nd of January last week 
were . . . serious;. . . .  At all events something new has 
arisen in the deepest depths'of the Russian nation— -namely, 
the formation of a class of workmen.^
The World1s Week magazine reacted.to the massacre forcefully.
One of its writers maintained that the Russian industrial class
has been bled mercilessly by the Russian nobility and bureaucracy
causing the peasantry to suffer. He applauded the actions of the
St. Petersburg workers. Claiming that the strike was a political
one which must have shocked the Czar, the writer speculated:
Great must have been the surprise of His Majesty's Government 
to. find out that Revolutionary Russia is practically the 
whole Russia. . . all is quiet in St. Petersburg,but the
massacre will neither be forgotten nor forgiven.
Another periodical called the Atlantic Monthly reported
that: “A powerful wave of the people's wrath has risen from un-
•i
X"A Plea for Terrorism," ,The Independent. February 16, 1905,
pp. 3^9-350.
^Anatole Beaulin, "The Situation in Russia," The Independent, 
February 23, 1905, p. 406.
^Alfred Rambaud, "What Is Passing in Russia?" The Independent, 
March 23, 1905, t>. 293.
^Vladimir G. Simkhovitch, "Strike in St. Petersburg," World1s 
Week. March, 1905, pp. 5977-5981.
fathomable depths of the people's soul and rolled over all Russia. 
St. Petersburg-found itself before the horrible alternative of 
slaughter or anarchy,” To the American people the slaughter which 
resulted from the strike on January 22, 1905 was Justification for 
the Russian people to react angrily. The American public condemned 
the emperor and Russian nobility for allowing such a despicable 
act to.happen. "'All classes condemn the authorities and more 
particularly the emperorreported the United States Consul
in Odessa."^
|
One!of the American periodicals greatly over-stated the
number of dead .occurring as a result of the massacre Cas compared'
I '
to later figures on record). In an article of The American Monthly
i  ■ 'Review of Reviews it was stated that:
Ajn industrial strike of vast proportions developing into 
political riots which held the Russian capital in a state 
of seige and resulted in the killing by the military (on 
January 22) of 2,100 and the wounding of 5 , 0 0 0  of the 
demonstrators who had gathered before the Winter Palace 
tip present a petition to the Czar, has almost set the 
entire empire ablaze. . . .3
This article, as well as many others, compared the incident to the
French Revolution. Amother issue of this magazine expressed the
idea that Russia was ripe for change. "Russia is on the throes
|1Paul Milyoukov, "Present Tendencies of Russian Liberalism," 
Atlantic Monthly, March 1905* P* ^13*
|^Kochan, Russia in Rev.. p. 80.
I 3"is it a Revolution?" The American Monthly Review of Reviews, 
February 1905» P- 153*
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of a great political and social change."*
Newspapers also blazed with reaction to the Bloody Sunday
events. The Sunday World Herald of Omaha, Nebraska-on
January 22, 1905 made the public aware of the planned strike.
Headlines read: RUSSIAN RULER MAX BE FACING A REVOLUTION: WORKMEN
ARE PREPARING FOR A GREAT DEMONSTRATION AT THE WINTER PALACE THIS
AFTERNOON? WARNED TO STAX AWAY, BUT SAY THEY HAVE NO FEARS, AS
SOLDIERS SYMPATHIZE WITH THEM. After the massacre, the morning
World Herald of Omaha, Nebraska devoted the entire front page of
its newspaper to reporting Bloody Sunday. :>Its headlines read:
BLOOD FLOWS IN THE STREET; SUMMARY OF ST. PETERSBURG CRISIS; BOUND
TO AVENGE THOSE WHO FELL; and FATHER GAPON LEADS THE HOST. On the
24th the same periodical headlines: ST. PETERSBURG IN A STATE OF
SIEGE. 'It included a political cartoon which cried out against
the despotism of the Russian Czar. As the week went by, however,
the newspaper turned to more exciting news of the war.^
Only one of the magazines-and newspapers examined by this
waiter was at all favorable to the Russian Czar. The Nation
defended the Russian government’s actions as necessary under the
international conditions which Russia faced at that time:
A government at war, with every energy strained to maintain 
its armaments and its military activity at a distance of a 
thousand miles, cannot be expected to take chances with 
the mob at the very seat of authority and depot of munitions.
*E.J. Dillon, "Dawn of a New Era in Russia," The American 
Monthly Review of Reviews. January 1905, p. 34.
^Headlines of Omaha World Herald. January 23» 1905» P» !•
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St. Petersburg. . '. . , has not yet been declared in a state of 
siege, but the policing of the city was inevitably military 
rather tham civil the moment the strike reduced the population 
to idleness and furnished the tinder for a revolutionary 
conflagration, would any other government have acted different- 
1 ly in similar circumstances?1
Whether this question had any validity or not, it was over-looked
in the heat of the emotional times of 1905 and the popular outrage
over the Bloody Sunday.
The magazine called Outlook sent a special reporter to 
St. Petersburg just to report on the aftermath of the massacre.
E. J. Poole sailed for Russia on January 28th to report first hand. 
At first he wrote anonymous articles for fear that he would be 
deported from Russia; later he identified himself. Poole expressed 
quite clearly what appeared to be the feelings of many Americans.
He talked about the "iron hand" which held the Russian people under 
an iron rule but expressed the belief that: . . a  people cannot
i
be killed, though their liberties may be suppressed; nor can the 
development of a race be permanently arrested... . . "2 Poole 
wrote that:
The autocracy in Russia has shown. . . blindness, and the 
Czar showed it on Sunday morning of last week-when the great 
opportunity of his life came, and neither he nor apparently 
anyone around him saw it-. On that day the tragedy of the 
Romanoff dynasty began; for then and there the Czar threw away 
the enormous capital of affection and trust which had slowly
1hIrrepressible Reform in Russia," Nation. January 26, 1905.
p. 6l.
*E. j, Poole, "St. Petersburg is Quiet,” Outlook^ March 18, 1905. 
pp. 681-689.
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gathered around the throne for many generations— and had become 
a possession unalienable by its own folly. . . .  He has shown 
himself utterly unable to understand his own people, and when 
the great critical moment, big wit'h fate, came, he closed the 
1 door in its face, met the cry of his people, out of their 
hearts by a volley of rifle shot. . . . There has been no 
more dramatic moment in modern history. . . .
Poole continued to send back reports of the continued Russian furor 
which the Bloody Sunday incident started. He described the gloomy 
silence in St. Petersburg caused by the matrial rule prevalent in 
the city. People were quiet because there were soldiers every­
where; also thousands-.:more could easily be summoned by telephone. 
Modern weapons (gatling guns) could be brought into use. The work­
men were silent— St. Petersburg was quiet— deadly quiet. Poole 
talked to some persons to get their reactions. He found that the 
Russian workmen had lost any small trust they had had in the bureau- 
ocrats. Feeling that they were being spied upon and lied about, the 
people explained that the rulers were totally ridiculous. They 
exclaimed: "It is pitiable to see rulers so ignorant that after
Sunday's struggle they say this was caused by Japanese and English
p
who bribed the workmen to strike against their kind father." As 
a result of his interviews and observations, Poole concluded that 
there was evidence to prove to him that the worker's demands were 
completely legitimate. He believed that the strikers had struck 
to raise the wages and conditions of the great mass of unskilled* 
laborers and skilled women who were grossly underpaid. He felt
^E. J. Poole, "St. Petersburg is Quiet," Outlook, March 18, 
1905i pp. 681-689.
2Ibld., p. 288.
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some people had joined the strike as a protest for self-government. 
Poole definitely sympathized with the strike and expressed the 
belief that the Czar had made a grave mistake in the course of 
action he sanctioned to squelch the strike.
The writers of the Outlook also furthered the idea that
Bloody Sunday was the beginning of a revolution in Russia. In
describing the massacre they wrote: "In that terrible moment the
people saw that there was no 'little father,' only an autocrat;
and for the first time was heard in Russia the ominous cry, 'Down
with the Czar!'. . . a revolution has b e g u n . O n e  Outlook writer
expressed the belief that the turmoil would not soon end:
But that it will be possible eventually to repress this rev­
olution we do not for a moment believe * , . .' The matyred 
workingmen of St. Petersburg have died for liberty, and 
martyrs do not die in vain,. . . . As we look across the sea 
to that host of ignorant, bewildered, oppressed, superstitious 
workingmen, led by the priest in his golden vestments, holding 
aloft the cross, the rattle of musketry and the shrieks and 
groans of the wounded die away, and we hear only the silent 
song of their hearts. . . .2
The writers of thfe- Outlook felt that a ". . . duel. . .
(was} being fought between the Czar and the Russian people, and 
it can have but one end. . . the Old Russia has passed away as 
completely as the France of the Old regime has gone."*^ Outlook 
writers believed that only a written constitution.for Russia could
i
save Russia from Revolution. They expressed a negative view of
l
■^E. J. Poole, "A New Russia," Outlook, February 25# 1905# 
p. 263.
^E. J. Poole, "Is it a Revolution?" Outlook, January 28, 1905# 
p. 217.
.3poole, "A New Russia," p. 472.
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1
the Czar, calling him a weak, false, and cruel ruler.
The American public which reviewed the magazine and news­
paper articles during and after the Bloody Sunday event was swayed 
and influenced by the reports they read. It can be seen that the 
American public, as interpreted by the news media of the time, 
did react to the Bloody Sunday massacre. "Editorial writers in 
the United States continued to extend warm sympathy to the Russian
’ o
people in their struggle for a free government,. . . ."7
In Russia the Bloody Sunday revolution is said to have been 
the impetus for the long time of struggle which eventually resulted 
in thb Russian Revolution of 191?• Immediately following the 
massacre, tens of thousands of revolutionary pamphlets were widely
spread and read. Strikes spread to other major cities. For most
|
of th^ two years following the incident the Czar was not safe among 
his people. In 1906, he still did not dare venture out of his 
imperial yacht and cruised aimlessly off the coast of Russia. "In
i
the immediate sense Gapon's demonstration failed. Yet after Bloody 
Sunday, Russia was never the same again. The massacre of an 
unarmed, hymn-singing crowd undermined the standing of an autocracy 
to an incalculable degree, not only in Russia but also abroad."-^
The Russia of the Middle Ages had turned into a revolutionary Russia.
The events of January 1905 furthered revolutionary ideas among
i
the Russians. The demand for revolutionary literature grew and
^''Russia Needs a Constitution," Outlook, February 25» 1905» p* 695*
p
;Thomas A. Bailey, America Faces Russia; Russian American 
Relations from Early Times" to Our Pay (ithaca, New Yorki Cornell 
University Press, 1950), p. 207.
-ICochan, Russia in Rev., pp. 80-81.
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as social democracy sent down deep roots, the revolutionary move­
ment gripped wider circles, “Bloody Sunday completed what the 
Japanese war had begun. . . the major sequel to Bloody Sunday 
Qras) the political activization of the masses. The massacre, 
sup'erimposed on the ferment already provoked by the war, made 
political concern a mass phenomenon in Russian society.
There were some attempts of reform made as a result of 
Bloody Sunday. Before the Russo-Japanese war, the question of 
universal education had been advanced. But it was not until the 
revolutionary outburst of 1905-1906 that the question was seriously 
taken up by the Government; then some progress was made toward 
improvement in education. Also, it was not until after the revo­
lutionary outbursts and agrarian riots of 1905-1906 that the
Russian government started any definite policy for the improvement
2of peasant land tenure and farming. The efforts were not always 
concerted, however, as is evident by the eventual revolution and 
disagreements which erupted twelve years after the incident in 
January 1905*
The revolution of 1905*• • •» had not taken place until the 
end of the Russo-Japanese War. Then, the danger from outside 
having passed, all varities of revolutionaries were free to 
put forward their own far-reaching and conflicting programs, 
with the result that the forces of progress dissipated their 
strength in conflicts among themselves.3
1-Florinsky, End Russian Empire, pp. 12-13*
2Ibld.. p. 182.
3
Christopher Lasch, The American Liberals and the Russian 
Revolution, (New York and Londont Columbia University Press, 1962), 
p. 19*
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Though there was some disagreement among those advising
reform, positive action was taken in answer to the obvious need for
change. The actions taken in January 1905 against the people did
encourage a rapid growth of the liberal following in Russia. It
was -this common point of agreement, extending both to the right of
the Liberationists and to their left that, at this time, led workers
increasingly to support the Liberatlonlst call for a constituent
assembly. Divisions continued to exist, but Russians in greater
numbers than ever before were working in a common struggle:
'Liberty and representative government* was their unifying 
slogan, the Marseillaise their marching song. By the end of 
- January, even the doggedly monarchist and conservative 
Novoe Vremya was impelled to call for a semsky sobor (an 
elected assembly).1
The American public welcomed the thought of a Duma for'the 
Russian people. They were greatly encouraged by the thought that 
such a step was a forecast for the future improvement of life in 
Russia:
• . ., I believe, the coming imperial Duma is about to give 
free scope for the first time in Russian history. . . . But 
it really is a beginning,. . . . The Duma once in working 
order, everything else is sure to follow, and it is upon 
that conviction that I base my forecast that the new era of 
internal development which has been inaugurated simultaneously 
with the Peace of Portsmouth will bring forth changes more 
beneficent and more marvelous than the most sanguine among 
us venture to anticipate.2
Both the American hopefuls and Russian reformers were 
disappointed in subsequent events in Russia. Power still remained 
In the hands of the Czar and what he decided depended on his
^Harcave, First Blood, pp. 116-117.
2
E.J. Poole, "A Duma for Russia,*' Outlook, September 30, 1905, 
pp. 267-271.
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interpretation of the causes and consequences of Bloody Sunday
and his judgment of the relative importance of the various steps
to, be taken in the readjustment period. He continued to give
priority to the reestablishment and preservation of order? he
insisted on absolute power*
It might have occurred to some rulers, in a situation of 
this kind, that the most direct method of restoring order 
could be determined by giving immediate attention to some of 
the current demands of his people. But Russian Tsars were no 
more accustomed to recognizing impertinent demands for 
reform than to negotiating with strikers. . .. . Nicholas 
himself, less than a month before Bloody Sunday, had in­
structed his subjects. . . to mind their own affairs.1
Nicholas believed that the disorders had been provoked by liberals
and decided that he must reassert his control with firmness so that
the revolutionaries would be warned off. "His understanding of the
revolutionaries was as fuzzy and distorted as was the oppositions
2understanding of what went on in his mind.” He began his regime 
of firmness the day after Bloody Sunday by demanding that order be 
restored using any measures necessary. Within a few days there 
was no question that the steps taken had been effective and the 
government was in physical control of the city once again.
Though the insurrection was quieted temporarily in St. Petersburg, 
the turmoil it had started had only begun. Bloody Sunday was only 
the first scene in the long drama which was to climax with the 
Russian Revolution of 1917.
1
Harcave, Pirst Blood, p. 118.
2ib ia .
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CONCLUSION
The Bloody Sunday Massacre of January 22, 1905 has been 
shown to be a relatively small labor strike which spread across 
Russia and became the "Revolution of 1905*" The turmoil of this 
year foreshadowed the coming tempetuous revolution which resulted 
in the final overthrow of the Russian autocracy.
Close analysis of the events which led up to the labor 
march and eventual slaughter, demonstrate the historical coincidence 
of certain men.being the "man of the moment"; of one man being in 
the right place at the propitious time with ideas appropriate to 
the needs of the moment or movement. Father George- Gapon was the 
"man of the moment" in the historical drama of Bloody Sunday. The 
Russian police allowed him to start his labor group, the workmen 
trusted him and followed his guidance. That his lead turned out 
to be personal disaster for many of them is historical record. 
However, there can be no doubt that Gapon was instrumental in help­
ing to arouse the Russian laborer of the early 1900's and encourage 
him to look for ways to express his outrage and futility over his 
-deplorable working conditions. There can also be no doubt that 
It was Russia's loss that the ruling class of Russia refused to 
listen to workmen's and peasants' cries of futility and frustration. 
The Bloody Sunday protest turned into a dramatic focus on the plight 
of the common man of 1905 in Russia.
The United States government did not officially react to
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the Bloody Sunday slaughter. The present writer has given a possible 
explanation that due to the illness of Secretary of State Hay,
President Theodore Roosevelt acted as his own Secretary of State 
in most instances. At the time of January 22, 1905» Roosevelt was 
deeply involved in trying to arbitrate a settlement of the Russo- 
Japanese War. Developments of an international nature evidently 
caused; Roosevelt to be distracted from any Internal domestic affairs 
of Russia at that time. Thus, no direct mention is made of Roosevelt'is
reacjtion to the massacre in any of his letters written during the1 |
time| period of the incident. Since Roosevelt expressed great dis-
i j
dain! and distrust of the Russian autocracy, it might be concluded
i •
that|Roosevelt would have been personally shocked at such wanton
j
"blc^d-letting8' of innocent citizens. However, as President of
I ' -   ' '
the United States, there was no way in which Roosevelt could express
any reaction he might have felt. Similarily, there was no media
through which the United States government could officially react
i
to Bloody Sunday. Since it was an internal affair, no other govern­
ment had any right to criticize the ruling class for the way in 
which it handled its domestic problems. Rather, since the
United. States, embodied in the person of President Roosevelt, was
0
attempting to settle the Russo-Japanese War, there was great cause 
and n£ed for much discretion to be taken in regard to any criticism
i
made against either country. Therefore, the incident is recorded
!
in United States documents, but no official action was taken.
i
jJournalists of the United States did react to the shocking 
Bloody Sunday massacre. The reaction of the newsmen reflected
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the reaction of the American public which must have been swayed by 
the reporters' reactions and whose opinions- of the slaughter could 
have been influenced by the journalistic conclusions which were 
made. The initial reporting of the incident was typical of any news 
reporting of such an emotion-packed incident. It described the 
blood -and gore and cruelty of the massacre. Naturally the Ameri­
can public reacted with disbelief, horror, and great sympathy toward 
the workers' plight. The common man of the United States identi­
fied with the underpaid, overworked, and reportedly mal-treated 
laborer of Russia. Outraged American families abhorred the thought 
of defenseless women and children being shot down with little 
warning.
Most Americans saw the Bloody Sunday aftermath as a signal 
for a revolution which would inevitably result from the breaking 
of faith such as the Russian ruling class demonstrated during 
the strike and after the Duma was created as a result of the 
strike. Independent-minded Americans could understand the laborers' 
protests and empathize with them. The United States citizen of 
1905 could not forgive a government which would so totally ignore 
or squelch such a protest by using bullets and sabres as its 
silencers. Such a despotic government deserved to be overthrown 
by a popular revolution.
It has been shown that the American public did react to the 
Bloody Sunday massacre— not through any official channels or 
government pronouncements. They reacted with disbelieving horror 
as voiced through the magazines and newspapers of the time. The
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American people of 1905 reacted as any people of any time would 
react to the mass murder of innocent citizens who were appealing 
to a beloved leader; they reacted with an outraged cry against 
such a dispicable deed.
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APPENDIX A
PETITION OF WORKERS AND 
RESIDENTS OF SAINT PETERSBURG 
FOR SUBMISSION TO NICHOLAS II 
ON JANUARY 9» 1905
We, workers and residents of the city of St* Petersburg, of 
various ranks and stations, our wives, children, and helpless old 
parents, have come to Thee, Sire, to seek justice and protection# 
We have become beggars* we are oppressed and burdened by labor 
beyond: our strength* we are humiliated; we are regarded, not as 
human beings, but as slaves who must endure their bitter fate in 
silence. We have endured it, and we are being pushed further and 
further into the depths of poverty, injustice, and ignorance; we 
are being so stifled by despotism and arbitrary rule that we 
cannpt breathe. Sire, we have no more strengthI Our endurance 
is at an end# We have reached that awful moment when death is 
preferable to the continuation of intolerable suffering.
; Therefore we stopped work and told our employers that we 
would not resume work until they complied with our demands# We 
asked for little. We desire only that which is indispensable to 
life,! without which there is nothing but slavish labor and end­
less ;agony. Our first request was that our employers discuss our 
needs with us, but this they refused to do; they denied that we 
have a right to speak about our needs, on the grounds that the 
law does not recognize such a right. They also treated as illegal 
our other requestsi to reduce the working day to eight hours, to 
establish wage rates in consultation with us and with our consent, 
to investigate our grievances against lower administrative person­
nel of the factories, to increase the daily wages for unskilled 
working men and women to one ruble, to abolish overtime, to 
administer medical aid carefully and politely, to construct work­
shops in which it would be possible to work without danger of 
death! from miserable drafts, rain, and snow.
i All this seemed illegal to our employers; each of our re­
quests was treated as if it were a crime, and our desire to 
improve our situation was considered an act of insolance and in­
sult •;
Sire, there are many thousands of us here; we have the ap­
pearance of human beings but, in fact, neither we nor the rest of 
the Russian people enjoy a single human right— not even the right 
to speak, think, assemble, discuss our needs, or take steps to 
improve our situation.
6o
We have been enslaved, with the help and cooperation of Thy 
officials. Any one of us who dares to speak up in defense of the 
interests of the working class and the people is jailed or exiledi 
it is as if it were a crime to have a good heart or a sympathetic
soul. Even to feel for one who is beaten, deprived of his rights,
or tortured is a grave crime. The entire people— workers and 
peasants— are at the mercy of the bureaucratic administration, 
which consists of men who rob the government and the people, men 
who.not only ignore, but also acorn, the interests of the people* 
Government by bureaucracy has devastated the country, has involv­
ed it in a horrible war, and is leading it further and further
into ruin. We, the workers and the people, have no voice at all
in determining how the huge sums extracted from us are spent; we 
are denied the means of participating in the levying of taxes or 
deciding how they are to be spent. The people have no opportunity 
of expressing their desires and demands. The workers are denied 
the opportunity to form unions for the defense of their interests.
Sire I Is this in accordance with God’s laws, by the grace 
of which Thou reignest? And is it not possible for us to live 
under such laws? Is it better to die— for all of us, the toiling 
people of all Russia, to die, allowing the capitalists (the ex­
ploiters of the working class) and the bureaucrats (who rob the 
government and plunder the Russian people) to live and enjoy 
themselves? This is the choice we face, Sire, and this is why we 
have come to the walls of Thy palace.Here we seek our last/ 
chance of salvation. Do not deny Thy people help; lead them out 
of the depths of injustice, poverty and ignorance; give them the 
chance to direct their own fate and rid themselves of the unbear­
able bureaucratic yoke. Tear down the wall between Thyself and 
Thy people and let them rule together with Thee, Hast Thou not 
been placed on the throne for the happiness of the people, and has 
not this happiness been denied to us by the bureaucrats, leaving 
us only unhappiness and humiliation? Examine our requests dis­
passionately and carefully; they are not evil in design, but are 
meant to help both us and Thee. We do not speak from insolence, 
but from a realization of the need to find a way out of the un­
bearable situation in which we find ourselves. Russia is too 
great, its needs too varied and profuse, to be governed by the 
bureaucrats alone. Popular representation is essental. The 
people must help themselves and govern themselves. It is only 
they who know their true needs. Do not refuse their help; accept 
it; and immediately order the summoning of representatives of the 
Russian land from all classes and all strata, including represen­
tatives of the workers. Capitalists, workers, bureaucrats, 
priests, doctors, and teachers— let them all, whoever they may be, 
choose their own representatives. Let all have a free and equal 
vote; and toward this end, order the election of a constituent 
assembly on the basis of universal, secret, and equal suffrage.
This is our chief request; in it and on it all else is based; 
this is the chief and only means of healing our painful wounds; 
without it, our wounds will fester and bring us to our death.
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But one measure alone cannot heal our wounds. Additional 
ones are indispensable#~ Directly and frankly as to a father, Sire, 
we tell Thee, in the name of all of the laboring class of Russia, 
what they are.*:
Indispensable arei
I. measures to eliminate the ignorance and disabilities of 
the Russian people
1) the immediate release and return of all those who have 
suffered for their political and religious convictions, 
for strikes, and for peasant disorders
2) the immediate declaration of freedom and inviolability 
of person, freedom of speech and the press, freedom of 
assembly, and freedom of conscience with respect to 
religion
3) universal and compulsory popular (primary) education 
at the expense of the state
4) responsibility of the ministers to the people and the 
guarantee of legality in administration
5) equality of all, without exception, before the law
6) separation of church and state
II# measures to eliminate the poverty of the people
1) abolition of indirect taxes and their replacement by
direct, progressive income taxes
2) abolition of redemption dues, (establishment of) cheap 
credit, and gradual transfer of land to the people
3) placement of orders for the Navy in Russia, not abroad
4) termination of the war in accord with popular demand
III# measures to eliminate the tyranny of capital over
labor
1) abolition of the system of factory inspectors
2) establishment in the factories and mills of permanent 
committees elected by the workers, which, together 
with the administration, will examine all claims of 
individual workers; no worker to be discharged except 
by decision of this committee.
3) freedom to establish consumers* and producers* 
(cooperatives) and trade unions— -as of now
4) the eight-hour working day and regulation of overtime
5) freedom of labor to struggle against capital— as of now
6) wage regulation— as of now
7) participation of working class representatives in the 
preparation of a bill for government insurance of 
workers— as of now.
These, Sire, are our chief needs, concerning which we have 
come to Thee, The liberation of our motherland from slavery and 
poverty is possible only through the satisfaction of these needs; 
only thus can she flourish; only thus will it be possible for 
workers to organize in protection of their interests against high­
handed exploitation by the capitalists and the plundering and 
oppressive governmental bureaucrats. Order these measures and 
take Thine oath to carry them out. Thou wilt thus make Russia
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both happy and famous, and Thy name will be engraved in our 
hearts and in those of our posterity forever# And if Thou dost 
not so order and dost not respond to our pleas, we will die here 
in this square before Thy palace# We have nowhere else to go and 
no purpose in going# We have only two roadsi one leading to 
freedom and happiness, the other to the grave. • • • Let our lives 
be a sacrifice for suffering Russia# We offer this sacrifice, 
not grudgingly, but gladly.*
George Gapon, priest
Ivan Vasimov, worker
1
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APPENDIX C
GAPON*S DESCRIPTION OP THE 
BLOODY SUNDAY MASSACRE
"Shall we go straight toward the gate, or by a roundabout 
route to avoid the soldiers?1' I was asked# I shouted huskily,
"No? straight through them# Courage! Death or Freedom!" and the 
crowd shouted in return, "Hurrah!" We then started forward, sing­
ing in one mightyv solemn voice the Tsar’s hymn, "God Save thy 
People#" But when we came to the line, "Save Nicholas Alexan- 
drovitch," some of the men who belonged to the Socialist party 
were wicked enough to substitute the words, "Save George Appol- 
onovitch," while others simply repeated the words, "Death or 
Freedom!" The procession moved in a compact mass. In front of me 
were my two body-guards and a young fellow with dark eyes from 
whose face his hard labouring life had not yet wiped away the 
light of youthful gaiety. On the flanks of the crowd ran the 
children# Some of the women insisted on walking in the first 
rows, in order, as they said, to protect me with their bodies, and 
force had to be used to remove them# I may mention also as a sig­
nificant fact that at the start the police not only did not inter­
fere with the procession, but moved with us with bared heads in 
recognition of the religious emblems. Two local police-officers 
marched bareheaded in front of us, preventing any hindrance to 
our advance, and forcing a few carriages that we met to turn aside 
in our favour# In this way we approached the Narva Gate, the 
crowd becoming denser as we progressed, the singing more impressive, 
and the whole scene more dramatic.
At last we reached within two hundred paces of where the 
troops stood# Files of infantry barred the road, and in front of 
them a company of cavalry was drawn up, with their swords shining 
in the sun. Would they dare to touch us? For a moment we trem­
bled, and then started forward again.
Suddenly the company of Cossacks galloped rapidly towards us 
with drawn swords. So, then, it was to be a massacre after all! 
There was no time for consideration, for making plans, or giving 
orders. //A cry of alarm arose as the Cossacks came down upon us.
Our front ranks broke before them, opening to right and left, and 
down this lane the soldiers drove their horses, striking on both 
sides. 1(1 saw the swords lifted and falling, the.men, women, and 
children dropping to the earth like logs of wood, while moans, 
curses, and shouts filled the air.H It was impossible to reason in 
the fever of this crisis. At my order' the front rows formed again 
in the wake of the Cossacks, who penetrated farther and farther,
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and at last emerged from the end of the procession*
Again we started forward» with solemn resolution and rising 
rage in our hearts. The Cossacks turned their horses, and began 
to cut their way through the crowd from the rear. They passed 
through the whole column and galloped back towards the Narva Gate, 
where— the infantry having opened their ranks and let them through—  
they again formed line. We were still advancing, though the 
bayonets raised in threatening rows seemed to point symbolically 
to our fate. A spasm of pity filled my heart, but I felt no fear. 
Before we started, my dear friend* the workman K , had said
to me, “We are going to give your life as a sacrifice,” So be itl 
"We were not more than thirty yards from the soldiers, being s 
separated from them only by the bridge over the Tarakanovsky 
Canal, which here marks the border of the city, when suddenly, with­
out any warning and without a moment's delay, was heard the dry 
crack of many rifle-shots. I was informed later on that a bugle^ 
was blown, but we could not hear it above the singing, and even if 
we had heard it we should not have known what it meant.
Vassilieff, with whom I was walking<hand in hand, suddenly 
left hold of my arm and sank upon the snow. One of the workmen 
who carried the banners fell also. Immediatelyone of the two 
police-officers to whom I had referred shouted out, “What are you 
doing? How dare you fire upon the portrait of the Tsar?** This, 
of course, had no effect, and both he and the other officer were 
shot down— as I learned afterwards, one was killed and the other 
dangerously wounded. - -
° I  turned rapidly to the crowd and shouted to them to lie down, 
and I also stretched myself out upon the ground. As we lay thus 
another volley was fired, and another, and yet another, till it 
seemed as though the shooting was continuous. The crowd first 
kneeled and then lay flat down, hiding their heads from the rain 
of.bullets, while the rear rows of the procession began to run 
away. The smoke of the fire lay before us like a thin cloud, and 
I felt it stiflingly in my throat./y An old man named Lavrentieff , 
who was carrying the Tsar's portrait, had been one of the first 
victims. Another old man caught the portrait as it fell from his 
hands and carried it till he, too, was killed by the next volley. 
With his last gasp the old man said, "I may die, but I will see 
the Tsar." One of the banner-carriers had his arm broken by a 
bullet. /A little boy of ten years, who was carrying a church 
lantern, fell pierced by a bullet, but still held the lantern' 
tightly and tried to rise again, when another shot struck him down.W 
Both the smiths who had guarded me were killed, as well as all 
those who were carrying the icons and banners? and all these 
emblems now lay scattered on the snow. The soldiers were actually 
shooting into the courtyards of the adjoining houses, where the 
crowd tried to find refuge, and, as I learned afterwards, bullets 
even struck persons inside, through the windows.
At last the firing ceased. I stood up with a few others who 
remained uninjured and looked down at the bodies that lay pros­
trate around me. I cried to them, "Stand upi" But they lay still.
I could not at first understand. Why did they lie there? I
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looked again, and saw that their arms were stretched out life­
lessly, and I saw the scarlet stain of blood upon the snow.
Then I understood* It was horrible. And my Vassilieff lay 
dead at my feet.
Horror crept into my heart. The thought flashed through my 
mind, "And this is the work of our Little Father, the Tsar,"* a
1
Gapon, Story of. pp. 180-184.
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